A Tale of Two Volunteer Programs: China and Taiwan

 

 By: Kevin McCauley

Recent developments have shown the volunteer recruitment systems in Taiwan and China moving on decidedly different trajectories. The Taiwan military’s attempt to implement a volunteer transition fully by the end of 2015, which already faced serious problems, appears to be in jeopardy after the death of 24-year-old Army Corporal Hung Chung-chiu from a heatstroke following extensive drills while in disciplinary detention. In addition, a short training period for new conscripts will contribute, along with limited joint and combined arms training, to declining operational readiness. A military with decreasing operational readiness and capabilities will be unable to execute a deterrence or defense strategy, weaken Taipei’s position in dealing with Beijing and force a reliance on the U.S. military for the defense of Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the PLA has taken an incremental approach to the transition to an all-volunteer force. Noncommissioned officer (NCO) reform, resulting in the expansion and qualitative improvement of the NCO force, combined with an active program to recruit qualified personnel, with an emphasis on college students and graduates, has increased the quantity and quality of volunteer personnel in the PLA. These programs to enhance military talent are important to PLA modernization efforts to build a high-tech force, which in turn would support a coercive strategy or diverse military operations  in a crisis.

Taiwan’s Volunteer Program
 
Public recriminations continue against the military over Hung’s death, placing Taiwan’s ability to recruit a volunteer force in doubt. A crowd of 30,000 in Taipei on July 20 protested outside of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), while a larger protest held on August 3 in Taipei drew a crowd variously estimated at 100-250,000. Furthermore, 18 officers and noncommissioned officers have been indicted and defense minister Kao Hua-chu resigned over the case (Taiwan News, August 2; China Post, July 27, 28, 31).

The results of a Taiwan public opinion poll released in late July showed that respondents did not trust the military judiciary to investigate and prosecute military personnel in the Hung case. The poll also showed that 74.7 percent of respondents viewed the Taiwanese military as “unfit to fight a war,” providing evidence of the military’s low credibility among Taiwanese civilians (Taipei Times¸ July 29; Central News Agency, August 4). This widespread lack of confidence in the military does not bode well for the future of a force whose capabilities appeared to be in decline even before the uproar over Hung’s death (“Taiwan Military Reform: Declining Operational Capabilities?” China Brief, June 7).

While military reforms are occurring,  it is not likely that indictments of a number of officers or military reforms can easily counter the impact of Hung’s death on public opinion (China Post, July 27). Colonel Hu Zhong-shi, director of the Recruitment Center of the National Armed Forces, admitted at a press conference that “the Hung case will surely have negative impacts on the plan.” Even before the uproar over Hung’s death, the volunteer plan appeared to be having serious trouble with both the quantity and the quality of its recruits. Colonel Hu reported on August 19 that only 72 percent of the 2012 recruitment goal had been met, and that only 4,290 personnel had been recruited out of the 2013 goal of 28,531 (China Post, July 22 and 28; Central News Agency, August 20).  The MND announced on August 19 that it will loosen requirements, place greater emphasis on recruiting women and work to promote recruitment (Central News Agency, August 20). It is doubtful these measures will fill the recruitment gap without an increased defense budget to provide improve pay and benefits.

Source: http://www.jamestown.org

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China and Kazakhstan: Inevitability of Beijing’s Growing Influence

 

For centuries, China was a major source of wealth for the nomadic peoples of Central Asia: the relationship between the steppe and one of the most developed settled civilizations had been full of both bloody confrontations and prosperous trade. This history has imprinted itself on Central Asians, and Kazakhs in particular, who share a long border with China and who hold mixed feelings about the expanding Chinese influence in their country, ranging from open sinophobia to an acceptance of its inevitability. 

Former Chinese leader Hu Jintao and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev (Source: Xinhua)

The news that China is likely to secure the Texas-based oil company ConocoPhillips’ share in Kashagan, Kazakhstan’s largest oil project (see EDM, July 9), was not sensational but still raised eyebrows. The Chinese offer of $5 billion had outbid India’s intention to participate in the project. India’s involvement in developing Kashagan would have complemented Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign relations and economic policy, exposing its domestic oil market beyond just Western oil companies (which still dominate the scene), in addition to Russia and China. Yet, by acquiring ConocoPhillips’ stake in Kashagan, Chinese holdings in the Kazakhstani oil market are likely set to increase significantly.  

urrently, China accounts for 12 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, while the European Union takes up some 72 percent (http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/moscow/kazakhstan-to-buy-conocophillips-84-share-in-26069211). It is difficult to judge the exact share China holds in the oil market due to unclear ownership estimates—China had been acquiring most of its stakes in Kazakhstan’s oil projects in partnership with the Kazakhstani state oil company KazMunaiGas Exploration Production, in which China Investment Corporation holds an 11-percent share (http://www.kmgep.kz/eng/investor_relations/shareholder_structure/).  

Source: http://www.jamestown.org

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CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran's Coup

 

Sixty years ago this Monday, on August 19, 1953, modern Iranian history took a critical turn when a U.S.- and British-backed coup overthrew the country's prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. The event's reverberations have haunted its orchestrators over the years, contributing to the anti-Americanism that accompanied the Shah's ouster in early 1979, and even influencing the Iranians who seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran later that year.

 

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But it has taken almost six decades for the U.S. intelligence community to acknowledge openly that it was behind the controversial overthrow. Published here today -- and on the website of the National Security Archive, which obtained the document through the Freedom of Information Act -- is a brief excerpt from The Battle for Iran, an internal report prepared in the mid-1970s by an in-house CIA historian.
The document was first released in 1981, but with most of it excised, including all of Section III, entitled "Covert Action" -- the part that describes the coup itself. Most of that section remains under wraps, but this new version does formally make public, for the first time that we know of, the fact of the agency's participation: "[T]he military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy," the history reads. The risk of leaving Iran "open to Soviet aggression," it adds, "compelled the United States ... in planning and executing TPAJAX."

TPAJAX was the CIA's codename for the overthrow plot, which relied on local collaborators at every stage. It consisted of several steps: using propaganda to undermine Mossadegh politically, inducing the Shah to cooperate, bribing members of parliament, organizing the security forces, and ginning up public demonstrations. The initial attempt actually failed, but after a mad scramble the coup forces pulled themselves together and came through on their second try, on August 19. 

Why the CIA finally chose to own up to its role is as unclear as some of the reasons it has held onto this information for so long. CIA and British operatives have written books and articles on the operation -- notably Kermit Roosevelt, the agency's chief overseer of the coup. Scholars have produced many more books, including several just in the past few years. Moreover, two American presidents (Clinton and Obama) have publicly acknowledged the U.S. role in the coup.
But U.S. government classifiers, especially in the intelligence community, often have a different view on these matters. They worry that disclosing "sources and methods" -- even for operations decades in the past and involving age-old methods like propaganda -- might help an adversary. They insist there is a world of difference between what becomes publicly known unofficially (through leaks, for example) and what the government formally acknowledges. (Somehow those presidential admissions of American involvement seem not to have counted.)

 

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